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Abstract. In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are
incomplete as descriptions of the players’ information for the purposes of determining a
player’s behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts.
We then investigate what is essential about a player’s information to identify rationalizable
behavior in any game. We do this by constructing the universal type space for rationaliz-
ability and characterizing the types in terms of their beliefs. Inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs
over conditional beliefs, what we call ∆-hierarchies, are what turn out to matter. We show
that any two types in any two type spaces have the same rationalizable sets in all games if
and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchies.
1. Introduction
1.1. Example. Consider the following two player game of incomplete information. There
are two states of the world Ω = {−1,+1}. Each player i has three actions Ai = {ai,bi,ci},
and a payoﬀ ui which depends on the actions chosen by each player and the state of the
world. The payoﬀs are summarized in the following table.
a2 b2 c2
a1 1,1 -10,-10 -10,0
b1 -10,-10 1,1 -10,0
c1 0,-10 0,-10 0,0
ω = +1
a2 b2 c2
a1 -10,-10 1,1 -10,0
b1 1,1 -10,-10 -10,0
c1 0,-10 0,-10 0,0
ω = −1
Focusing only on the subsets {ai,bi}, we have a common interest game in which the players
wish to choose the same action in the positive state and the opposite action in the negative
state. Failing to coordinate is costly, and the action ci is a“safe”alternative when, conditional
on the state, i is uncertain of his opponent’s action.
To complete the description of the game, we need to specify the players’ information about
the state, the players’ information about one another’s information, and so on. One way to
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model these hierarchies of belief is given by the following type space: Each player i has two






4 if ω = ti · t−i
0 otherwise
In this type space, each player assigns each state equal ex ante probability, but would
learn the state with certainty, were he to learn his opponent’s type. In particular, if the two
players’ types have opposite sign, the state is certainly ω = −1 and if the types have the
same sign, then the state is certainly ω = +1.
In the game with this information structure it is possible in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for the players to achieve perfect coordination where types ti = 1 play ai and types ti = −1
play bi. Symmetrically, there is another equilibrium where ti = 1 play bi and ti = −1 play
ai. Obviously it is also an equilibrium for both to play ci independent of type.
1.2. Type Spaces and Hierarchies. A type space is a convenient device for specifying in
a parsimonious way the inﬁnite string of data (hierarchies of belief) necessary to close the
model. This was the view of Harsanyi (1967-68) and it is the standard practice in economic
models with incomplete information. We can see from our example how hierarchies of beliefs
are embedded in the type space. Each player assigns equal probability to each state of the
world. These are the ﬁrst-order beliefs. Since player i holds this ﬁrst-order belief regardless
of whether is type is −1 or +1, and since player −i assigns probability 1 to player i having
one of these two types, it follows that each player is certain of the others’ ﬁrst-order beliefs.
These are the second-order beliefs. The same reasoning implies that each player is certain
of the other’s second-order beliefs and so on. Indeed, in this type space it is always common
knowledge that the two states are equally likely.
One potential concern with the use of a type space for modeling hierarchies of belief is
the following. If hierarchies of belief are what really matter, then we must be assured that
any hierarchy we might wish to model can be captured in some type space. This concern
has been resolved by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) who
showed that when the set of states of the world Ω has some minimal structure, then any
internally consistent (“coherent”) hierarchy can be modeled using a type space. In fact, there
exists a single universal type space U(Ω) which simultaneously captures them all: for every
coherent hierarchy there is a type in the universal type space with that hierarchy.1
1On the other hand, when the set of states lacks the topological structure assumed by these authors,
Heifetz and Samet (1999) showed that the type space framework may not be suﬃciently general to model
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There is another potential concern which has not received the same attention. The type
space we used in our example is but one of many that would capture those speciﬁc hierarchies
of belief. Indeed, any speciﬁcation of the players’ hierarchies can be equally well generated
by many diﬀerent type spaces. If hierarchies are what matter, and if type spaces are simply
a convenient device used to model them, then we should be assured that the predictions we
would get from a given hierarchy should not depend on the particular type space used to
model it. However, the type space can matter, and this can be seen in our example.
Recall that in our example, each player has the same hierarchy of beliefs regardless of his
type. It appears that there is a spurious duplication of types. So instead consider the simpler
type space in which each player has exactly one type and this type knows the other player’s
type and assigns equal probability to the two states of the world. Formally, T ∗
i = {∗}, and
there is a common prior µ∗ given by µ∗(∗,∗,+1) = µ∗(∗,∗,−1). This type space generates
exactly the same hierarchies of belief as in our ﬁrst example: common knowledge that the
states are equally likely. However, when the game in our example is played over this type
space, the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the unique correlated equilibrium, indeed the
unique rationalizable outcome, is for both players to play ci.2
We cannot be assured that our predictions are invariant to the choice of the type space.
This is not a showstopper however, it simply means that our premise was wrong: it is not
(only) hierarchies that matter for (correlated) equilibrium and rationalizability. While the
additional types in the original type space are duplicates in terms of their hierarchies, they
are not redundant because they generate a payoﬀ-relevant means of correlating behavior with
the state of the world.3 What matters in an incomplete information game are the hierarchies
and the information a player with a given hierarchy would obtain about the state of the
world conditional on knowing the other player has a given hierarchy.
2It deserves emphasis that the issue we are pointing to here is distinct from the familiar one that adding
redundant types to an information structure creates the possibility that the players can correlate their action
choices and thus increases the set of equilibrium outcomes. That observation is equivalent to the statement
that the set of correlated equilibria of a game is larger than the set of Nash equilibria of a game. To see
that something diﬀerent is happening in our example, note that the sets of correlated equilibria in the two
games are distinct. Adding redundant types in order to generate correlation in play can never aﬀect the
set of correlated equilibria (see Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)). Indeed, it can never aﬀect the set of
rationalizable outcomes as it does here.
3A similar example and observation appears in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2003). They introduce a
new version of rationalizability in which players can conjecture correlations between the opponents action and
the state beyond those correlations that are explicitly modeled in the type space. Conventional hierarchies
are suﬃcient to identify the sets that are rationalizable under this alternative deﬁnition. In the context of
our example, all actions satisfy their deﬁnition for every type in every type space.4 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
To make the point in another way, let us frame the discussion in the context of the Mertens
and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) universal type space. In U(Ω), there
is exactly one type for each possible coherent hierarchy. And by the deﬁnition of a type
space, for each type there is a belief deﬁned over the product of the types of the other player
and the states of the world. This implies that for each pair of hierarchies (i.e. universal
type) ti and t−i, there is only one possible belief ti can have about states of the world
conditional on knowing that the opponent has hierarchy t−i (modulo measure zero variations
in versions of conditional probability). Indeed, one can interpret the representation theorems
of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) as proving that if the
players’ information is completely summarized by their hierarchies, then the modeler has no
freedom in specifying these conditional beliefs as they are in fact uniquely determined. On
the other hand, we see from our example that even in very simple, standard type spaces,
two types with the same hierarchies can hold diﬀerent conditional beliefs, and that this can
make a diﬀerence in outcomes. It is easily veriﬁed that the universal types corresponding to
the hierarchies in our example behave like the types in the second type-space, not the ﬁrst.4
Thus, the universal type space is not rich enough to model what could be modeled in an
alternative type space.
This observation has some signiﬁcance for the philosophical debate (see Aumann (1987),
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), and Gul (1998)) about whether or not the information
structure in a game is common knowledge. The universal type space has been interpreted
as precisely that information structure that can be assumed without loss of generality to
be common knowledge. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) suggest that the
universal type space realizes Aumann’s hypothesis of a completely speciﬁed “state space.”
This is certainly true if, as in Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), one considers the information
structure purely as a model of beliefs (about beliefs) about uncertain events. But if what
is important is the the range of possible behaviors in a game and not just beliefs, then our
example shows that there is a loss of generality in assuming that the universal type space
4Any type in any type space has a“representative”type in U(Ω). The representative is the unique type in
U(Ω) with the same hierarchy. Thus, any type space can be mapped into U(Ω). When this mapping applied
to the ﬁrst type-space we considered, the two types of player i are collapsed to a single type t∗
i which assigns
probability 1 to t∗
−i. Thus, the image in U(Ω) of our ﬁrst type space is isomorphic to our second type space.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 5
is commonly known. In particular, this assumption would imply that whenever the players
commonly know that each state in the example is equally likely, they must play action c.5.
1.3. Universal Types for Rationalizability. As argued above, from the point of view of
rationalizability, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of a player’s
information. The goal of this paper is to identify exactly what must be known about a
player’s information to determine what will be rationalizable for that player in any game of
incomplete information. To do this, we ﬁrst construct a type space which is universal in the
following sense. Any type in any type space can be interpreted as a rule which associates
each game form with the set of actions that are rationalizable for that type. We construct
a space of types R by collecting every rule associated with any type in any type space. We
show how to view R as a proper type space and that for this type space the rationalizable
rule associated with any type is exactly the rule used to deﬁne it. If what we care about
when we consider a player’s“type”is how that player might conceivably behave in any game
(i.e. what is rationalizable), then R is universal in the sense that it contains every possible
type.
To further emphasize the point made in the previous subsections, let us observe that R
is larger than the standard universal type space. To see this, revisit our example from the
introduction. Each of the types ti of player i in the ﬁrst type space we examined has a
rationalizable rule. (In fact it is easily shown that they have the same rule.) Let us try
to ﬁnd a type in U(Ω) that gives rise to the same rule. The ﬁrst thing to observe is that
any such type must have the same hierarchy of beliefs as ti. Indeed, for any two types with
distinct hierarchies there is some game in which they have distinct rationalizable sets.6 But
as we mentioned previously, there is only one type in U(Ω) with this hierarchy and this type
cannot have the same rule because it has a diﬀerent rationalizable set in the game from our
example.
Next, we characterize the types in R in terms of their beliefs. We show how to interpret
any type ti in any type space as an inﬁnite hierarchy of beliefs about conditional beliefs. Here
5In Section 6 we present an example that makes an even stronger point in this regard. There we describe
a game with an action that could not be played in any Bayesian Nash (or correlated) equilibrium by any
type when it is assumed that the universal type space is common knowledge. Nevertheless, this action could
be played in a very simple, completely standard type space where there is common knowledge of rationality
and common knowledge that the players’ beliefs are coherent.
6This is a consequence of the more general Theorem 2 below. However, this particular implication can be
shown directly by considering games (similar to those in Morris (2002)) in which players are asked to name
their own hierarchies and bet on the announcement of the other. Two types with diﬀerent hierarchies will
disagree about some n-th order belief of the opponent and the state of the world, and there is some bet that
would separate them.6 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
the ﬁrst order belief is the probability distribution over all the possible conditional beliefs the
player could have about the state of the world. This probability distribution is derived for
ti as follows. First, determine for each type of the opponent what would be the conditional
belief ρ(ti,t−i) ∈ ∆(Ω) of ti if the opponent’s type were known. Then, the probability of
any set X ⊂ ∆Ω of possible conditional beliefs is the probability ti assigns to the set of
types t−i for which ρ(ti,t−i) belongs to X. Once we have derived ﬁrst-order beliefs of this
form for every type, we can in the usual way derive the second-order beliefs: the probability
any type ti assigns to the events consisting of ﬁrst-order beliefs of the opponent and the
conditional beliefs of ti. Higher-order beliefs are deﬁned analogously. Let us refer to the
resulting inﬁnite hierarchies as ∆-hierarchies. In a completely standard fashion, we may
construct the universal space U(∆Ω) of all ∆-hierarchies.
We show that the mapping which associates each type in R with its ∆-hierarchy is a
bijection, R ↔ U(∆Ω). The implication is that within this particular type space, R, to
determine what is rationalizable for a player in any game, it is necessary and suﬃcient to
identify that player’s ∆-hierarchy. We then extend this characterization to all possible type
spaces. We consider for any type space the natural mapping into R that maps types to their
associated rationalizable rule. This mapping preserves ∆-hierarchies. Thus, by the previous
result, two types from any (possibly diﬀerent) type spaces have the same rationalizable
behavior across games if and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchies.
The rest goes as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and deﬁnitions used in the paper.
Section 3 is central to the paper: it presents construction, analyzes properties and character-
izes space R. Sections 4 and 5 sketch some of the proofs. Section 6 comments and contains
further examples.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation. If A is a topological space, we treat it as a measurable space with its Borel
σ-ﬁeld, denoted BA. ∆A is the space of Borel probability measures. If A is a Polish space,
then ∆A endowed with the weak∗ topology is also Polish. For any a ∈ A let δ (a) ∈ ∆A be
the Dirac measure concentrated on a point a.
For any measure µ ∈ ∆A and integrable function f : A → R we use µ[f] to denote the
expectation of f with respect to µ. For any measure µ ∈ ∆(A × B), denote by CAµ(·) :
B → ∆A a version of conditional probability over A given b ∈ B (which exists whenever A
is Polish. Our results do not depend on the choice of version). Similarly, for any measurable
subset B0 ⊆ B, we denote CAµ(B0) ∈ ∆A as conditional probability given B0.
KA is is the space of all non-empty closed subsets of A with the Hausdorﬀ metric. If A is
Polish, then so is KA.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 7
Given two measurable spaces, A,B and a measurable mapping φ : A → B we can in
a natural way deﬁne a mapping which transports probability measures ∆φ : ∆A → ∆B,
such that for any measure µ ∈ ∆A, any measurable subset B0 ⊆ B, we have ∆φ(µ)(B0) =
µ(φ−1 (B0)).
2.2. Type spaces. We consider games with two players. We take as given a Polish space of
basic uncertainty Ω. A Type space over Ω, T = (Ti,µi)i=1,2 is a pair of measurable spaces Ti
and two mappings µi : Ti → ∆(Ω × T−i). We say that a type space has weakly measurable
beliefs if for any measurable function f : Ω × T−i → R, sets
{ti : µ[f] < 0}
are measurable. We say that a type space has strongly measurable beliefs, if there exist jointly
measurable functions ρi : Ti × T−i → ∆Ω, such that
ρi (ti,t−i) = CΩµ(ti)(t−i).
Let T W(Ω) be the collection of all type spaces over Ω with weakly measurable beliefs and
T S(Ω) be the collection of all type spaces over Ω with strongly measurable beliefs7.
A type mapping between two type spaces T,T 0 ∈ T S (Ω), denoted φ : T → T 0 is a pair of
measurable mappings φi : Ti → T 0
i.
2.3. Games. A game form (or simply game) over Ω is a tuple G = (ui,Ai)i, such that Ai
are Polish spaces and ui : Ai × A−i × Ω → R are bounded measurable functions for both
i. A game G = (ui,Ai)i is compact, if ui are continuous and Ai are compact. A game
G = (ui,Ai)i is ﬁnite if ui are continuous and Ai are ﬁnite. We let G denote the class of all
compact games, however all of our results apply equally well if G is taken to be (smaller)
class of all ﬁnite games.




. We construct a product game G = G1 × G2 = (Ai,ui), where the action sets in G
are the products of the actions sets from the original games, Ai = A1
i × A2









































Note that G ∈ G.
7Obviously any type space with strongly measurable beliefs has also weakly measurable beliefs, T S(Ω) ⊆
T W(Ω). The connection in the other way is not clear. For any type space T ∈ T W(Ω), standard theorems
guarantee existence of conditional beliefs ρ(ti,t−i), which are measurable in t−i for given ti. We do not
know, in general, whether we can choose conditional beliefs which are jointly measurable
This is in fact possible in some special cases. Suppose that sets of types Ti in type space T ∈ T W(Ω)
are separable and metrisable. Then, we think we may show that conditionals can be chosen in a jointly
measurable way and T ∈ T S(Ω).8 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
2.4. Interim Rationalizability. Fix a type space T ∈ T S(Ω), and a game G = (Ai,ui).
An assessment is a pair of subsets α = (α1,α2) where αi ⊂ Ti × Ai. Alternatively an
assessment can be deﬁned by the pair of correspondences αi : Ti ⇒ Ai, with αi(ti) := {ai :
(ti,ai) ∈ αi}. The image αi(ti) is interpreted as the set of actions that player i of type ti
could conceivably play.
A behavioral strategy for player i is a measurable function σi : Ti → ∆Ai. The expected













The strategy σi is a selection from the assessment α if for each i, σi(ti) ∈ ∆αi(ti) for all
ti ∈ Ti. Let Σi(αi) be the set of all strategies for i that are selections from α.
For some results, it is convenient to use an alternative notation for payoﬀs and strategies.
Given a payoﬀ function ui : A × Ω → R, we derive a new payoﬀ function πi : A × T → R,
deﬁned directly in terms of the types as follows
πi(a,t) = ρi(ti,t−i)[ui(ai,a−i,·)].
A conjecture for player i is a probability measure σ∆
−i ∈ ∆(T−i×A−i). The set of conjectures











For any behavior strategy σ−i, and for any ti, there is a conjecture σ∆






for every ai ∈ Ai. Conversely, if σ∆
−i is a conjecture for ti, then there is a behavior strategy
σ−i satisfying the same equalities. This is to show that we can either work with behavioral
strategies or conjectures, whichever is most convenient.
An action ai is an interim best-response for ti against σ−i if Ui(ai,σ−i|ti) ≥ Ui(a0
i,σ−i,|ti)
for all a0
i ∈ A−i. Let Bi(σ−i|ti) denote the set of all interim best-responses for ti to σ−i.
Likewise B∆
i (σ∆
−i|ti) the set of all best-responses to the conjecture σ∆
−i. If X is some subset
of strategies (or conjectures), then Bi(X|ti) (respectively B∆
i (X|ti)) is the set of all best-
responses to elements of X.
An assessment α has the best-response property if every action attributed to player i is an
interim best-reply to some selection from α−i, i.e,
αi ⊂ {(ti,ai) : ai ∈ Bi(Σ−i(α−i)|ti)}HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 9
If the above is satisﬁed with equality, then we say that α has the ﬁxed-point property.
Proposition 1. There exists a maximal (in the sense of set inclusion) assessment with the
ﬁxed-point property
Proof. It is easy to verify that the union of assessments with the best-response property has
the best-response property. Let R be the union of all assessments with the best-response
property. Obviously R is the maximal set with the best-response property. We claim that R
has the ﬁxed-point property, in which case it will be the maximal such set. If R did not have
the ﬁxed-point property then there exists a type ti and action ai such that ai is an interim
best-reply to some selection from R−i. But then we can add the pair (ti,ai) to R and obtain
a larger assessment with the best-response property, a contradiction. 
Deﬁnition 1. Given a type space T, and a game G, the interim rationalizable correspondence
is the maximal assessment with the ﬁxed-point property, denoted RG,T. We say that ai is
interim rationalizable for type ti if ai ∈ R
G,T
i (ti).
We conclude this section by stating some important properties of rationalizable corre-
spondences which are proved in Section 5. The rationalizable correspondence is non-empty,
closed-valued, and measurable in a strong sense.8
Proposition 2. For each type space T ∈ T S(Ω), for each type ti ∈ Ti, the set R
G,T
i (ti)
of interim rationalizable actions is non-empty and closed. Thus, we can view R
G,T
i as a
function from Ti to KAi. This function is measurable: for every B ∈ BKAi, the set
{ti ∈ Ti : R
G,T
i (ti) ∈ B}
is a measurable subset of Ti.
3. The Space of Rationalizable Rules
In this section we construct and characterize the universal type space of rationalizable
rules.







Any element ri of Si can be viewed as a rule which assigns a (closed) subset of AG
i to each
G ∈ G - recall that KAG
i is a compact Polish space with the Hausdorﬀ metric. The value of
8It is somewhat surprising that the correspondence need not be closed (i.e. upper hemi-continuous) even
for compact games and Ω compact, indeed even for ﬁnite games when Ω is ﬁnite. This is shown by example
in section 6.10 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
a rule ri on particular game G ∈ G is denoted by ri (G). We equip Si with the associated
product topology and Borel σ-algebra.
A rule ri is rationalizable if there exists a type space T and a type ti ∈ Ti such that
R
G,T
i (ti) = ri(G) for every G ∈ G. We use the notation R
(·),T
i : Ti → Si for the mapping
which associates types in T with their corresponding rules. Let Ri be the subset of Si







The space Ri inherits the topology and σ-algebra from Si. The derived σ-algebra is denoted
BRi.
We pause here to record the following important fact used repeatedly later.
Lemma 1. For any type space T ∈ T S (Ω), the mapping R
(·),T
i : Ti → Ri is measurable.
Proof. By the monotone class theorem and the choice of topology on Ri, we need to check






























KA is an open subset KA ⊆ KAG
i and R
G1,T











(KA) is measurable in Ti. 
3.2. R as a Type Space. Our goal is to treat R as a type space by assigning beliefs to
each rule ri ∈ Ri. We do this by transporting in the natural way the beliefs of some type
ti (in some existing type space) from which ri was derived. There are two purposes of this
exercise. First, it will allow us to check whether the construction is internally consistent.
Having speciﬁed beliefs of each type in R we can solve for the rationalizable actions within
the type space R of any type ri for any game G and determine the rule R
(G),R
i (ri) generated
by ri. Then we can check whether this rule R
(G),R
i (ri) indeed coincides with ri. Next, once
we have veriﬁed the internal consistency, we can proceed to characterize rationalizable rules
in terms of their beliefs and higher-order beliefs. The latter will be the focus of the remainder
of the paper.
There is an important subtlety involved in transforming R in an internally consistent way
into a type space. In this subsection we will revisit the example from the introduction to
illustrate the issues involved and to motivate the development to follow. Consider the direct
approach to deﬁning the beliefs of a rule ri ∈ Ri. Since ri is a rationalizable rule, thereHIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 11
is a type ti in a type space T which generates ri. Recall that R
(·),T
−i : T−i → R−i is the
measurable mapping which carries types from T−i into the space R−i. To deﬁne the beliefs
of type ri = R
(.),T
















This is not enough however, as we must deﬁne beliefs of ri over types of the opponent and
states of the world. To make these beliefs consistent with those of the original type ti, the
only choice is to put:
CΩµ
R











i.e. conditional on a rule r−i of the opponent, ri holds the same beliefs over Ω as ti would
have conditional on the set (R
(·),T
−i )−1(r−i) of types in T−i which generate rule r−i.
Unfortunately, with beliefs translated in this way, some important information from the
original type space T is lost, and the internal consistency of the construction fails. To see this,
let us trace through these mappings as applied to the type space from the introduction. First
of all, as we mentioned previously, both types of player i generate the same rationalizable
rule, so R
(·),T
i (+1) = R
(·),T
i (−1) := ri for i = 1,2. Then by (3.1), type ri must assign
probability 1 to the single type r−i (she knows the rule of her opponent), and by (3.2), type
ri must assign equal probability to each state of the world (conditional on r−i). In other
words, independent of the opponent’s information, ri thinks that each state is equally likely.
But such a type is isomorphic to the type ∗ from the second type space T ∗ in the example
which we previously showed has a diﬀerent rationalizable rule. In the terminology we use
below, this way of mapping beliefs does not preserve rationalizable sets and this means that
the rule of type ri is not equal to ri, i.e. the model is not internally consistent.
The right way to transform R into a type space is therefore somewhat more involved. Our
development will involve two steps. First, we need to identify what information contained
in the beliefs from the original type space T is important for rationalizability in that type
space. As our discussion in the introduction suggests, what are important are beliefs about
conditional beliefs. To develop a framework for such beliefs, we will consider a new class of
type spaces where the space of basic uncertainty is ∆Ω, the space of (conditional) beliefs
about Ω. A type in such a type space has beliefs about the opponent’s type and ∆Ω. In
the usual fashion, these can be unfolded into beliefs about ∆Ω, beliefs about the opponent’s
beliefs about ∆Ω and so on. We will show how to treat the space of rationalizable rules as a
type space R(∆) over ∆Ω. In a certain sense, this is the right way to think about the space
of rules.12 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
Nevertheless, in order to determine what is rationalizable for a type in a game (whose
payoﬀs are deﬁned over Ω) we must be able to calculate expected payoﬀs and so we must
interpret the beliefs as probabilities over the opponent’s type and Ω. Having seen the con-
struction of the space R(∆), it will be readily apparent how to transform R(∆) back into a
type space over Ω in such a way that the ﬁnal type space, R(Ω), is internally consistent.
3.3. The Type Space R(∆). Let us take as our space of basic uncertainty the (Polish)
space ∆Ω. Exactly as with Ω itself, we can deﬁne a type space over ∆Ω. The beliefs of
a type ti in such a type space T are probabilities over ∆(∆Ω × T−i). We interpret these
as joint probabilities over the types of the opponent and conditional beliefs about Ω. We
will consider the class of all type spaces over ∆Ω with weakly measurable beliefs, denoted
T W (∆Ω).
There is a natural way in which any type space T = (Ti,µi) over Ω can be transformed






∈ T W (∆Ω). Let T ∆
i = Ti and for any ti ∈ T ∆
i we deﬁne
µ∆
i (ti) ∈ ∆(∆Ω × T−i) to be the unique probability measure satisfying the following two
conditions:






i (ti) = marg
T−i
µi (ti),
(2) conditional beliefs of ti ∈ T ∆
i about ∆Ω given type t−i are a point mass on the
conditional belief ti in Ti given type t−i
C∆Ωµ
∆
i (ti)(t−i) = δ (CΩµi (ti)(t−i)),
here δ (·) denotes Dirac delta measure.
The logic behind this deﬁnition is the following. The translated beliefs µ∆
i (ti) capture
exactly the joint probability over opponent’s types and the resulting conditional beliefs as
embodied in µi(ti). In the appendix we show that this deﬁnes a weakly measurable belief
mapping.
Lemma 2. Suppose that T ∈ T S (Ω). Then T ∆ ∈ T W (∆Ω)
Now, we may deﬁne the beliefs of a rule ri ∈ Ri generated by some type ti by trans-
porting the transformed beliefs µ∆
i (ti). Find some type space T and type ti ∈ Ti, such that
R
(·),T
i (ti) = ri and put
µ
R











As deﬁned, the beliefs of type-rules ri are potentially dependent on the choice of type
space and type ti ∈ Ti. Since there are potentially many type spaces with diﬀerent typesHIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 13
having the same rationalizable rule, it is important to verify that all such types will generate
the same beliefs:
Proposition 3. For any two type spaces T,T 0 ∈ T S(Ω), any two types ti ∈ Ti,t0
i ∈ T 0
i, if
both types generate the same rules,
R
(·),T





























To see how this treatment avoids the problem with the more direct approach, let us return
to the example from the introduction. Recall that ri is the rule generated by both types of
player i. The previous proposition states that w.l.o.g the beliefs of ri can be derived from




i (+1,δ{ω=+1}) = µ
∆
i (−1,δ{ω=−1}) = 1/2.









i (ri)(r−i,δ{ω=+1}) = µ
R
i (ri)(r−i,δ{ω=−1}) = 1/2.
Just as before, the two types of the opponent generate the same rule and so will be mapped
to a single element r−i and so ri must assign probability 1 to r−i, i.e. she knows the rule of
her opponent. However, now type ri assigns equal probability to the events “the opponent
has rule r−i and I will know for sure that the state is +1” and “the opponent has rule r−i
and I will know for sure that the state is −1.” This is exactly the joint probability over
(R-equivalence classes of) types of the opponent and conditional beliefs held by the original
type from which ri was derived.
Having deﬁned the beliefs, the ﬁnal element is to show that the belief mapping is weakly
measurable, so that R(∆) is a well-deﬁned type space. The proof of the following proposition
is deferred to the next section (4.2).
Proposition 4. The belief mapping µR
i : Ri → ∆(∆Ω × R−i) is weakly measurable. Thus,
R ∈ T W (∆Ω)
3.4. The Type Space R(Ω). By viewing R as a type space over ∆Ω, we have identi-
ﬁed rationalizable rules with their beliefs about the types of the opponent and conditional
probabilities of events in Ω. Recall that Proposition 3 states that for type spaces over Ω,
these beliefs precisely determine a type’s rationalizable rule. Our goal is to show that the
mapping which associates an arbitrary type ti with its rule ri = R
(·),T
i (ti) ∈ R(∆) pre-
serves (the essential structure of) these beliefs and therefore that as a type R
(·),T
i (ti) has the14 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
same rationalizable rule as ti, namely ri. This will show that the construction is internally
consistent.
However we cannot make this argument working with R(∆), as it is not a type space over
Ω. First, to be able to discuss rationalizability, we must ﬁnd the right model for R(∆) within
the class of type spaces over Ω. The structure of beliefs in R(∆) suggests the answer. In
R(∆), given a rule for the opponent, a type ri has a (possibly non-degenerate) probability
distribution over conditional beliefs about Ω. On the other hand, within any type space
over Ω, any type can have only one conditional belief about Ω for each possible type of the
opponent. Thus, to replicate the structure of beliefs from R(∆) within a type space over Ω,
we must include a suﬃciently rich set of types. Indeed, our set of types will be of the form
Ri × ∆Ω with the idea that type (ri,τ) will be the type whose rationalizable rule will be ri
and conditional on which player −i will have belief τ over Ω.
Precisely, we deﬁne a type space over Ω, R(Ω) = (R × ∆Ω,µ
R(Ω)
i ) in the following way.




i (ri,τi) ∈ ∆
 
Ω × (R × ∆Ω)−i

as the unique measure satisfying the following two conditions:





i (ri,τi) = µ
R
i (ri),
(2) given any (r−i,τ−i) ∈ (R × ∆Ω)−i conditional beliefs about Ω are equal to τ−i,
Cµ
R(Ω)
i (ri,τi)(r−i,τ−i) = τ−i
Obviously the conditional probabilities are measurable so that these beliefs properly deﬁne
a type space with strongly measurable beliefs, R(Ω) ∈ T S(Ω).
3.5. Internal Consistency of R(Ω). For any type space T ∈ T S(Ω) and an arbitrary
τ ∈ ∆Ω, consider the type-mapping φT,τ : T → R × ∆Ω deﬁned by
φ
T,τ
i (ti) = (R
(·),T
i (ti),τ). (3.3)
The measurability of φT,τ follows from Lemma 1.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that type mapping φ : T → T 0 , T,T 0 ∈ T S (Ω) preserves rationaliz-
able sets, if for all games G ∈ G, for all types ti ∈ Ti
R
G,T
i (ti) = R
G,T0
i (φi (ti)).HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 15
We will present some suﬃcient conditions for a mapping to preserve rationalizable sets
and show that φT,τ satisﬁes these conditions. These conditions are described in terms of the
way in which beliefs are implicitly transformed by the mapping.
Suppose that we have two type spaces T = (Ti,µi),T 0 = (T 0
i,µ0
i) over the same space of
basic uncertainty X (for our purposes, X will be either Ω or ∆Ω.) Consider a type mapping
φ : T → T 0, such that for every ti, there is a measurable mapping φti : T−i → T 0
−i, such that,

















The mappings φti are referred to as the dual mappings. We can interpret the dual mapping
φti as describing how player i type ti “thinks” that types of the opponent are transported.
We say that a type mapping is exact iﬀ φti = φ for every ti (or types t−i are transported
in exaclty the same way as type ti ”thinks”). We say that a type mapping φ is exact with
respect to beliefs iﬀ for every ti ∈ Ti and every t−i ∈ T−i,
µ
0 (φti (t−i)) = µ
0 (φ(t−i)) (3.5)
(or beliefs of types t−i are transported in exaclty the same way as type ti ”thinks” about
transporting beliefs). Thus, an exact mapping is also exact with respect to beliefs. We
say that a type mapping preserves beliefs iﬀ for any type ti ∈ Ti and for almost any type
t0




















We say that a type mapping preserves conditional beliefs iﬀ for any type ti ∈ Ti, for almost
any type t−i ∈ T−i
CXµ(ti)(t−i) = CXµ
0 (φ(ti))(φti (t−i)). (3.7)
Thus, if a mapping preserves conditional beliefs, then it also preserves beliefs. However, the
converse does not hold necessarily. Consider the type mapping informally described in the
introduction which associated types in the example with their counterparts in the universal
type space U(Ω). It can easily be checked that this mapping preserves beliefs but does not
preserve conditional beliefs. Indeed the mappings considered by Mertens and Zamir (1985)
and Heifetz and Samet (1999) which associate types with their hierarchies are equivalent to
our exact, belief-preserving type-mappings. They do not preserve conditional beliefs. The
following lemma shows that the latter is a suﬃcient condition for a mapping to preserve
rationalizable sets.
Lemma 3. Suppose that for type spaces T,T 0 ∈ T S(Ω) there is a type mapping φ : T → T 0,
which is exact with respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs. Then it preserves
rationalizable sets.16 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
Proof. Fix a game G. The rationalizable correspondence for G in type space T is R
G,T
i .
Consider the following assessment for typespace T 0
α
0










where ˆ φ = φ × idA. We will show that α0
i has the best-response property.
Let us write S0























and for any t0




Pick ti ∈ Ti. Let t0
i = φ(ti), ai ∈ R
G,T
















−i ◦ ˆ φ
−1
i










To show this, we ﬁrst use the fact that φ preserves conditional beliefs to establish that the
type-dependent payoﬀ function πi is preserved under φ. For any action proﬁle a, and type
proﬁle ˆ t ∈ T,
π
T
























i (a,φ(ˆ ti),φti(ˆ t−i))

























The third equality holds because by the construction of σ
∆,T












−i) ∈ C}) = σ
∆,T





This establishes our claim.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 17






i). In particular, because φti(R
G,T









−i ) = 1. We have therefore shown that ai ∈ BT0
i (α0
−i|t0
i). since ai was
arbitrary, we conclude R
G,T










i). It follows that
R
G,T













It now follows from (3.8) that α0 has the best-response property.
Now turn to the rationalizable correspondence R
G,T0








We will show that α has the best-response property.
Pick ti ∈ Ti. Because φ is exact with respect to beliefs, for any t−i, φt−i(ti) and φ(ti)
have the same beliefs in T−i, and therefore R
G,T0
i (φt−i(ti)) = R
G,T0
i (φ(ti)). Thus, αi(ti) =
R
G,T0
i (φ(ti)). Let ai ∈ R
G,T0







such that ai ∈ BT0
i (σ
∆,T0
−i ). We derive a conjecture for ti in a few steps.
First, consider the behavior strategy σ0






select a measurable version of CA−iσ
∆,T0





−i) for each t0
−i. Now
there corresponds a behavior strategy for T, namely σ−i = σ0









−i ◦ ˆ φ
−1
i







−i (α−i) = [σ
∆,T


















−i ) so that ai ∈ BT
i (α−i|ti). As ai was selected arbitrarily, we have shown that α has
the best-response property.
To summarize, we have shown that there is an assessment on T 0 with the best-response
property such that R
G,T
i (ti) ⊂ α0
i(φ(ti)). Since R
G,T0
i includes any assessment with the best-
response property, it follows that
R
G,T
i (ti) ⊂ R
G,T0
i (φ(ti))
Likewise, in the opposite direction we showed
R
G,T0
i (φ(ti)) ⊂ R
G,T
i (ti)18 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
and this concludes the proof. 
It is easy to check that by the deﬁnition of beliefs in the type space R(∆), for any type space
T ∈ T S(Ω), the type mapping R(·),T : T ∆ → R(∆) is in fact exact and preserves beliefs. We
argue in the proposition below that, as a consequence, the type mapping φT,τ : T → R(Ω)
is exact with respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs. Then lemma 3 allows us to
say that φT,τ preserves rationalizable sets.
Proposition 5. For any type space T ∈ T S (Ω) and τ ∈ ∆Ω, the type mapping φT,τ : T →
R(Ω) is exact with respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs. Hence, it preserves














By Lemma 1, φ
T,τ
































































(the third equality comes from our observation in the text that the mapping R(·),T : T ∆ →
R(∆) is exact and preserves beliefs; the fourth from the deﬁnition of beliefs on the space
T ∆). Therefore, the type mapping φ
T,τ
ti satisﬁes equation (3.4) and so is a valid dual mapping.






























i (ri,τi) = µ
R(Ω)
i (ri,τ0
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Take now any rationalizable rule ri ∈ Ri and some τi ∈ ∆Ω. There is type in a type space
ti ∈ Ti, such that ri = R
(·),T




i (ti) = R
(·),R(Ω)
i (ri,τ) = R
(·),R(Ω)
i (ri,τi).
The last equality comes from the fact that beliefs of types in R(Ω), hence by proposition 3
also their rationalizable sets, depend only on the ri-coordinate. 
The construction of the space R(Ω) assures that types (ri,τi),(r0
i,τ0
i) ∈ Ri(Ω) have the
same beliefs if they agree on the ﬁrst coordinate, ri = r0
i. The second part of the last
proposition strengthens the implication into equivalence: since types (ri,τi),(r0
i,τ0
i) ∈ Ri(Ω)
must have diﬀerent rationalizable behavior whenever ri 6= r0
i, it follows that they must have
also diﬀerent beliefs. Since beliefs of (ri,τi) ∈ R(Ω) are generated from beliefs of ri ∈ R(∆),
it follows that two diﬀerent rules ri 6= r0
i must have diﬀerent beliefs in type space R(∆). In
particular, the implication of proposition 3 may be strengthened to equivalence: two types
generate the same rules if and only if they generate the same beliefs about conditional beliefs
and rules of the opponent.
3.6. ∆-hierarchies. Our construction of the space of rationalizable rules has one advantage
and one fault. The advantage is that it is direct and relatively simple. The fault is that its
construction reveals little about the internal structure of the space. The goal of this section
is to characterize rules in terms of their beliefs. We do this by ﬁrst presenting an alternative
type space which is deﬁned directly in terms of players’ beliefs. Then we show that this
space is actually equivalent to R(∆).
The idea behind this alternative construction is very simple. Recall that R(∆) is a type
space over ∆Ω. In completely standard fashion we may derive from the beliefs of any type
its ﬁrst-order beliefs about ∆Ω, second-order beliefs about the opponent’s ﬁrst-order beliefs
cross ∆Ω, etc. In other words, types in R(∆) can be interpreted as inﬁnite hierarchies of
beliefs over the space ∆Ω. We refer to these as ∆-hierarchies. We present below a version
of the Mertens and Zamir (1985) theorem on the existence of a universal type space U(∆Ω)
consisting of all such hierarchies.
Theorem 1 (Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (1999)). Let X be a Polish space and T W(X) the class of all type spaces over
X with weakly measurable beliefs. There exists a universal type space U(X) ∈ T W(X) such
that for any type space T ∈ T W(X), there is a unique exact and beliefs preserving type20 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
mapping uT
i : Ti → Ui (X)9. Moreover, Ui(X) ' ∆(X × U−i (X)) for both players i (in the
sense of homeomorphism).
The proof is in the appendix. It follows that of Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994). The
latter applies to continuous type spaces, but the proof is easily adapted to cover measurable
type spaces as in our case. When we apply the theorem to the Polish space ∆Ω, the mapping
uT∆
i : T ∆
i → U(∆Ω) gives the ∆-hierarchy of type ti ∈ Ti for any type space T ∈ T S(Ω).
We will show that R(∆) and U(∆Ω) are isomorphic with respect to exact and belief-
preserving type mappings. First, note that just as we transformed R(∆) into a type space
over Ω, we may deﬁne a type space L(Ω) where the set of types for i is Ui (∆Ω) × ∆Ω. and
the belief mapping µ
L(Ω)











i (ui,τi)(u−i,τ−i) = τ−i
for any (ui,τi) ∈ LΩ
i , and (u−i,τ−i) ∈ LΩ
−i. In particular, notice that beliefs (hence also
rationalizable sets) of any type (ui,τi) ∈ LΩ
i depend only on its ui-coordinate.
We show how to map any type space T ∈ T S(Ω) into L(Ω) in a way that preserves
rationalizable sets. First, ﬁx some τ ∈ ∆Ω and let inτ
i : Ui(∆Ω) → Li(Ω) be the inclusion
mapping inτ
i (ui) = (ui,τ). We may deﬁne a type mapping l
T,τ








Such a mapping preserves rationalizable sets, as the following lemma together with lemma
3 show:
Lemma 4. For any type space T ∈ T (Ω), a type mapping lT,τ : T → L(Ω) is exact with
respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs.
Proof. The proof here is completely analogous to the ﬁrst half of the proof in proposition
5 
Before we can show that spaces R(∆) and U (∆Ω) are equivalent (or, in other words,
the spaces R(Ω) and L(Ω)) are equivalent, we need one more result. Deﬁne the projection
projT : T × ∆Ω → T with proj(ri,τi) = ri.
Lemma 5. Let S,T ∈ T S (∆Ω).
9In the language of category theory, universal type space is a terminal object within the category of type
spaces T W (X) connected with type morphisms which are exact and preserve beliefs.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 21




is an exact with respect to beliefs, conditional beliefs preserving type mapping φ :
S × ∆Ω → T × ∆Ω.
(2) Suppose T has the following property: ti 6= t0
i =⇒ µi (ti) 6= µi (t0
i). Then for any
exact with respect to beliefs, conditional beliefs preserving type mapping φ : S×∆Ω →
T × ∆Ω, mapping
φ
∆ = projT ◦φ ◦ in
S,τ
is an exact, belief preserving type mapping φ∆ : S → T.
Notice that both spaces, R(∆) and U (∆Ω) have the property assumed in the second part
of lemma: U (∆Ω)by the previous theorem and R(∆) by the remark following proposition
5.
Proof. We begin with the ﬁrst part of lemma: φ∆ is exact and preserves beliefs. For any






















































(where the third equality comes from exactness and belief preserving of φ∆). It is immediate
to verify that φ is exact with respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs.
We move to the second part of the lemma: Since φ preserves conditional beliefs and
is exact with respect to beliefs, there is for any (si,τi) ∈ S × ∆Ω a measurable mapping
φ(si,τi) : S−i × ∆Ω → T−i × ∆Ω, such that equations (3.4), (3.5), (3.7) hold. Due to the fact
that φ is exact with respect to beliefs, it must be that if φ−i (s−i,τ−i) = (t−i,τ−i), then for
every (si,τi) ∈ Si ×∆Ω, there is τ0
i ∈ ∆Ω, such that φ(ui,τi) (s−i,τ−i) = (ti,τ0
i). Indeed, types
with diﬀerent t-coordinate have diﬀerent beliefs. Therefore,
projT ◦φ(si,τi) = projT ◦φ22 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI








































and φ∆ preserves beliefs. 
We can ﬁnally prove the theorem
Theorem 2. There are unique exact and beliefs preserving type mappings ι : U (∆Ω) →
R(∆) and ι−1 : R(∆) → U (∆Ω). Either mapping is inverse of the other: ι−1 ◦ ι = idU(∆Ω)
and ι ◦ ι−1 = idR(∆).
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of type mapping ι−1 is assured by theorem 1. In order
to show existence of exact, beliefs-preserving mapping from U (∆Ω) to R(∆), note ﬁrst
that by the ﬁrst half of proposition 5, there is exact with respect to beliefs and conditional
beliefs preserving type mapping φL(Ω),τ : L(Ω) → R(Ω). The second part of lemma 5 then
guarantees existence of exact and beliefs preserving mapping
 
φL(Ω),τ∆ : U (∆Ω) → R(∆).
Suppose now that we have two diﬀerent exact and belief preserving mappings ι1,ι2 :
U (∆Ω) → R(∆). There is ui ∈ Ui(∆Ω), such that ι1 (ui) 6= ι2 (ui). By the ﬁrst part of lemma
5 there are then two type mappings φ1,φ2 : L(Ω) → R(Ω) which preserve conditional beliefs
and φ1 (ui,τ) = (i1 (ui),τ) 6= (i2 (ui),τ) = φ2 (ui,τ). By lemma 3, φ1 (ui,τ) and φ2 (ui,τ)
must have the same rationalizable rules. But this is a contradiction because proposition
5 shows that the rationalizable rule for φ1 (ui,τ) is ι1(ui) while the rationalizable rule for
φ2 (ui,τ) is ι2(ui).
The equality ι−1 ◦ i = idU(∆Ω) comes from the uniqueness of exact and belief preserving
mapping from U (∆Ω) to itself. The second equality i ◦ ι−1 = idR(∆) is a consequence of
the fact that i ◦ ι−1 would generate an exact with respect to beliefs and conditional belief
preserving mapping from R(Ω) to itself (the ﬁrst part of lemma 5 guarantees that). Such
a mapping has to preserve rules, so it has to preserve r-coordinates of types in R(Ω) This
implies that i ◦ ι−1 = idR(∆) 
This leads directly to the following corollary which is the main result of the paper.
Corollary 1. Any two types from any two type spaces have the same rationalizable rules if
and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchies, i.e.
R
(·),T
i (ti) = R
(·),S
i (si) ⇐⇒ u
T∆
i (ti) = u
S∆
i (si)HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 23
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The route T → T ∆ → U(∆Ω) → L(Ω) is the mapping lT,τ (see 3.9). By Lemma 4, this
mapping is exact with respect to beliefs and preserves conditional beliefs. By the ﬁrst part of
Lemma 5, ˜ ι has the same properties. Since these properties are preserved under composition,
the route T → T ∆ → U(∆Ω) → L(Ω) → R(Ω) is exact with respect to beliefs and perserves
conditional beliefs, hence it preserves rationalizable sets. Thus, it deﬁnes the same mapping
as the direct route φT,τ. This, together with Theorem 2 establishes that the diagram is
commutative. Thus, we can determine the rationalizable rules of types ti and si by tracing
the indirect route to R(Ω). Because ι is a bijection, the result follows immediately. 
4. Belief mapping
We have two goals in this section. First we want to show that belief mapping on the space
of rules does not depend on the choice of representative type and type space - hence it is
well-deﬁned (proposition 3). We show that types with the same rule have the same beliefs
about ∆Ω and rules of the opponent and types with diﬀerent beliefs have diﬀerent rules. To
this end we use special characterization theorem, proof of which, among others, contains a
construction of games which have diﬀerent rationalizable sets for diﬀerent beliefs. Second,
we attempt to show that the belief mapping is measurable (4).
4.1. Characterization of rules through beliefs. In the previous section we deﬁned beliefs
of type-rules over conditional beliefs and type-rules of the opponent, ∆Ω × R−i. It is often
useful to consider only restricted version of these beliefs: only about conditional beliefs and






, i.e. beliefs about
∆Ω×KAG
−i. Precisely, for any type we may deﬁne beliefs ∆R
G,T
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formula:
∆R











In other words, in order to determine beliefs ∆RG,T (ti), we need to take ﬁrst type ti ∈ Ti,
ﬁnd her beliefs µT∆
i (ti) ∈ ∆(∆Ω × T−i), compute rationalizable sets of the correspon-
dence of the opponent types in game G and transport naturally beliefs µT∆











In particular, if proposition 3 is true and we may properly deﬁne beliefs for every rule,
beliefs ∆R
G,T
i (ti) are equal to marginal beliefs of the type-rule. Precisely, take any game
G ∈ G, any type ti ∈ Ti and observe that, if proposition 3 holds, then
∆R
G,T

















for rationalizable rule ri = R
(·),T
i (ti). This comes from the deﬁnition of the space of rules:
its elements are product of rationalizable sets in diﬀerent games from G.
The important fact is:
Theorem 3. For any two type spaces T,T 0 ∈ T (Ω), any two types, ti ∈ Ti and t0
i ∈ T 0
i, if
for every game G ∈ G, rationalizable sets of both types are equal,
R
G,T





then for every game G ∈ G, beliefs of both types about ∆Ω and rationalizable sets of the
opponent in G are equal,
∆R
G,T





In other words, if rationalizable sets of both types are equal for any game G then types’
beliefs about rationalizable sets of the opponent and conditional beliefs about state of the
world are equal for any game G. (Note the order of the quantiﬁers!). We show ﬁrst how we
can use the theorem to prove proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 3. The proposition is a consequence of the theorem, but with one com-





































or that marginal beliefs about conditional beliefs and opponent rationalizable sets in game
G are the same. This statement holds for any G. However, it is not enough for us, since we
need to argue that joint beliefs about opponent’s rules (all of their rationalizable sets) are
actually the same.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 25
By Kolmogorov consistency theorem, it is enough to show that for any ﬁnite number of
































































To show this is however not so diﬃcult: Observe that product of rationalizable sets in games
G1,...,Gk is equal to the set of rationalizable actions in the product game G = G1×...×Gk,



































which ends the proof. 
We prove now the theorem. Suppose that there are two types ti ∈ Ti,t0
i ∈ T 0
i which have
diﬀerent beliefs about ∆Ω and rationalizable sets in at least one game G ∈ G. We show
that it means that there is potentially another game G0 ∈ G, in which each of two types
has diﬀerent rationalizable sets. The diﬃculty is that G0 is not necessarily equal to G - it is
possible that two types have the same rationalizable sets of actions in same game, despite
diﬀerences in beliefs.
Before we continue, we need a technical result. For a ﬁxed game G = (Aj,uj) ∈ G, deﬁne










τ [ψ (k,a1,...,aN2,ω)] :
for some natural N1,N2 and
continuous bounded function ψ : {1,...,N1} × A
N2





On the ﬁrst coordinate τ ∈ ∆Ω, functions f ∈ FG are “piecewise linear” and convex. On
the second coordinate K ∈ KA−i, they are set-increasing: for any two sets K ⊆ K0, K,K0 ∈




f − g : f,g ∈ F
G	
⊆ C (∆Ω × KA−i).
We have the following lemma:26 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
Lemma 6. For any game G the collection of sets {µ : µ[f] < 0} ⊆ ∆(∆Ω × KA−i) for
f ∈ LG generates the weak∗ topology on ∆(∆Ω × KA−i). In particular, for any µ,µ0 ∈












We leave the proof of lemma for the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that ∆RG∗,Tµ(ti) 6= ∆RG∗,T0µ0 (t0







The lemma says that there are natural numbers N1,N2 and continuous bounded function
ψ : {1,...,N1} × A
N2
−i × Ω → [0,∞) such that for f : ∆Ω × KA−i → R deﬁned by





















Suppose w.l.og. that the ﬁrst strict inequality holds. Find λ > 0, such that
∆R






We will prove the theorem by constructing a game G = (Aj,uj), such that RG,T (ti) 6=
RG,T (t0
i).






, such that A0
−i = {1,...,N1} and all actions of player
−i are rationalizable for all types of player −i, .i.e. for any t−i ∈ T−i any t0












−i (such a game always exists). Denote Z = {0,1} and deﬁne
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We show that the rationalizable sets for types ti and t0
i are diﬀerent in G. First observe,
that due to the product structure of the game G, for any type space S, for any type s−i ∈ S−i,
R
G,S








and for any si ∈ Si,
R
G,S









where Zi (si) ⊆ Z.
In type space T, consider the (pure) behavioral strategy for player −i which as type s−i
selects a0








−i,N2,ω)]. By the measurable maximum theorem, this deﬁnes
a measurable selection from R
G,T
−i .10 Call this strategy σ−i. We can deﬁne the analogous
strategy σ0
−i for type space T 0 where type t0
i replaces ti in the deﬁnition.
We calculate the payoﬀ to type t0





























i)[λf − 1] > 0.
Thus, 1 ∈ Zi (t0
i). On the other hand, the strategy σ−i clearly maximizes, among all ratio-
nalizable strategies for player −i in type space T, the payoﬀ that type ti could receive from









i (ti)(s−i)[ψ (k,a1,...,aN2,ω)] − 1
#
= ∆R
G∗,Tµ(ti)[λf − 1] < 0.
hence 1 / ∈ Z(ti). 










is measurable in s−i and R
G
∗,S
−i (s−i) is a measurable correspondence.28 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
4.2. Measurability. The above shows that the belief mapping on the space of rules µi :
Ri → ∆(∆Ω × R−i) is well-deﬁned. Here we show that this belief mapping is measurable.
We begin with a lemma identifying some measurable subsets of rationalizable rules.
Lemma 7. For any game G = (Ai,ui) ∈ G, for any closed subset A0 ⊆ Ai, the subset of
rationalizable rules {ri ∈ Ri : ri (G) ⊆ A0} is closed in Ri.
Proof. For closed A0, the set KA0 = {K ∈ KAi : K ⊂ A0} is closed in KAi (see Aliprantis
and Border (1994, Theorem 3.63)). Thus, by the deﬁnition of the product topology on Ri,
{ri ∈ Ri : ri (G) ⊆ A
0} = {ri ∈ Ri : ri(G) ∈ KA
0}
is closed. 





is Borel measurable. We prove the proposition by showing that D includes all measurable
sets.











V 0 ⊂ ∆Ω,V G ⊂ KAG
−i are measurable
and V G = KAG
−ifor all G / ∈ Γ
)
Note that C is an algebra (closed under taking complements, ﬁnite intersections and unions)
and generates the product topology and hence the σ-algebra on ∆Ω × R−i. We ﬁrst show
that C ⊂ D.
Consider any element V ∈ C for which Γ = {G} is a singleton. If we can show that
{ri : marg∆Ω×KAG
−i µR
i (ri)(V 0 × V G) ∈ I} is a measurable set of rules for every interval
I ⊂ [0,1], it will follow that V ∈ D. Since {µ ∈ ∆(∆Ω × KAG
−i) : µ(V 0 × V G) ∈ I}
is a measurable set, it suﬃces to show that marg∆Ω×KAG
−i µR
i : Ri → ∆(∆Ω × KAG
−i) is a
measurable mapping.
By Lemma 6 there is a base for the Borel σ-algebra, on ∆Ω × KAG
−i consisting of sets of
the form
W
f = {µ : µ[f] < 0}
for all functions f ∈ LG. In the course of the proof of Theorem 3, we showed that for any
fG ∈ FG and s ∈ R, there is a game ˜ G and a closed subset of actions ˜ A ∈ A−i such that for
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This implies that the following two sets of rationalizable rules are equal
n




















By Lemma 7, the ﬁrst set is measurable. Now since f = fG
1 −fG
2 for some fG
1 ,fG













































is measurable as countable union of ﬁnite intersections of measurable sets. Therefore the
inverse image of every set in a base for the sigma-algebra is measurable and this implies
that marg∆Ω×KAG
−i µR
i is measurable. (See Aliprantis and Border (1994, Lemma 8.16).) Now
consider an element V ∈ C for which Γ is an arbitrary ﬁnite set. Consider the product game,
˜ G =
Q
Γ G, where the product set V
˜ G =
Q
G∈Γ V G is a measurable subset of KA
˜ G
−i. By
the product structure, for any rationalizable rule r−i( ˜ G) =
Q
G∈Γ r−i(G). Thus if we deﬁne




−i, we have 1V 0 = 1V, and we have already shown that V 0 belongs
to D.
We have shown C ⊂ D. Now consider any sequence of measurable subsets En ⊂ ∆Ω×R−i
such that En ⊂ En+1, E ∈ D, and let E = ∪En. The sequence of indicator functions 1En
increases pointwise to 1E. By countable additivity, µR
i (ri)(E) = limµR
i (ri)(En), and hence














i (ri)[1En] ∈ I
	
which is measurable. Thus E ∈ D and D is a monotone class that includes the algebra C.
By the monotone class lemma, D includes all Borel sets. 
5. Compact and finite games
In this section we characterize rationalizable correspondences for compact games with
continuous payoﬀs. For this class of games, the procedure of iterative elimination of never-
interim-best-replies leads to R
G,T
i in at most a countable number of steps.11
11Without any assumptions on the game or the type space, one can show that the iterative procedure
leads to R
G,T
i after suﬃciently (transﬁnitely) many steps of elimination. This follows from a straightforward30 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the rationalizable
correspondence is non-empty and closed if the type space is a Polish space and satisﬁes the
additional property that the mapping from types to beliefs is continuous in a strong sense.
This implies in particular that the rationalizable correspondence is measurable for these type
spaces and that rationalizable sets for given type are compact. The space L(Ω) introduced
in section 3.6 naturally satisﬁes this condition.
Next, by lemma 4, from any type space, there is a measurable mapping preserving ratio-
nalizable sets to L(Ω). It will follow that the thesis of the Proposition holds for all type
spaces in T S(Ω).
Suppose that T is a type space and each Ti is a Polish space. Say that T is continuous if for
each i, the mapping µT
i : Ti → ∆(T−i × A−i) is continuous. If in addition, there is a version
of the conditional belief mapping ρi that is continuous then we say that T is ∆-continuous.
Note that ∆-continuity is a stronger property than continuity alone. We have two lemmas,
proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 8. If T is ∆-continuous, and G is a compact, continuous game, then πi is jointly
continuous.
It can be shown by an argument directly parallel to the proof of the previous lemma that
Ui is jointly continuous.
If B−i ⊂ T−i × A−i is an measurable assessment for i, then we say that σ∆
−i is compatible
with B if σ∆
−i(B) = 1. Given a type space, for any measurable subset B ⊂ T−i × A−i, and














Lemma 9. Suppose T is a continuous type space and let Si ⊂ Ti be a compact subset of
types and B ⊂ A ×−i T−i is a closed assessment. Then the correspondence
Σ
∆(B|·) : Si ⇒ ∆(T−i × A−i)
has compact graph.
Finally, we can show the proposition:
extension of the arguments in Lipman (1994). However, in general this set may be empty and the correspon-
dence need not be closed or even closed-valued. Compactness and continuity are used here only to deliver
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Proposition 6. Suppose that T is ∆-continuous and G is a compact game. Then the ratio-











Proof. We start with showing inductively that each R
G,T
n,i is a closed correspondence. It is
















−i ). By Lemma 9, there is a subsequence σ
∆,l





















−i ) for all l implies ai ∈ Bi(σ∆
−i). We have shown that (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T
n,i and
hence that the latter is closed.
The ﬁrst step implies that correspondence R
G,T
i is closed as intersection of closed sets.




i . Because R
G,T





k,i for every k, hence R
G,T
i is contained in R
G,T
i . To show equality, therefore,
it suﬃces to show that R
G,T
i also has the ﬁxed-point property and is therefore a subset of
R
G,T
i . We need to show
R
G,T
i = {(ti,ai) : ai ∈ Bi(σ
∆






Suppose ai ∈ Bi(σ∆
−i) for some σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(R
G,T
−i |ti). Then σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(R
G,T
k,−i|ti) for every k and
hence (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T
k,i for every k. This shows that (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T
i .
Suppose (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T
i , i.e. (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T





k,−i|ti) such that ai ∈ Bi((σ
∆,k
−i ). Since R
G,T
i is closed, we are allowed to use
lemma 9 to extract a convergent subsequence σ
∆,l
−i → σ∆
−i. Argument above should convince
us that ai ∈ Bi(σ∆
−i). In order to conclude that (ti,ai) is best response to some conjecture
from Σ∆(R
G,T
−i |ti), it is enough to check that σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(R
G,T
−i |ti). Notice however that this is






























n,i ) = 1.




k(l),−i|ti) for some k (l) : for








k(l),i) = 1. This ends the proof. 32 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
Proof of proposition 2. By the previous proposition, if T is ∆-continuous, then the ratio-
nalizable correspondence is closed. Because the range space Ai is compact, R
G,T
i is upper
hemi-continuous, i.e. for every closed F ⊂ Ai, the set {ti ∈ Ti : R
G,T
i (ti) ∩ F 6= ∅} is closed,
and in particular measurable. Now by Corollary 14.70 in Aliprantis and Border (1994), it is
measurable viewed as a function from Ti to KAi.
Notice that L(Ω) is ∆-continuous: conditional beliefs given type of the opponent (τ−i,u−i)
are equal to τ−i regardless of what is type of player i, ti. Hence, rationalizable correspondence
on L(Ω) is closed.
Lemma 4 shows that any type space T ∈ T S (Ω) can be mapped by a type mapping which
preserves rationalizable sets into space L(Ω) 12. Thus, for any given type space T ∈ T S(Ω),
the rationalizable correspondence RG
i ,T is the composition of this measurable mapping and
the rationalizable and closed correspondence for L(Ω), RG
i ,L(Ω). Thus, RG
i ,T is non-empty,
closed-valued, and when viewed as a function, measurable. 
6. Comments and other examples
6.1. Example. The conventional universal type space U(Ω) is not rich enough from the
point of view of solution concepts such as Bayesian equilibrium or Rationalizability. We
have previously shown this by demonstrating that there are types whose rationalizable rules
are not represented by any type in U(Ω). Here we present an example which makes the
point even stronger: there is an action which is not rationalizable for any type in U(Ω), yet
as we show below, it is easy to construct simple, perfectly standard type spaces in which
the action is rationalizable. Consider the two-player game with two states of the world with




a1 1,1 1,-9 -1,-9 -1,-1
b1 -9,1 0,0 -9,-9 -9,-1
b0
1 -9,-1 -9,-9 0,0 -9,1
a0





a1 1,1 1,-9 -1,-9 -1,-1
b1 -9,1 -9,-9 0,0 -9,-1
b0
1 -9,-1 0,0 -9,-9 -9,1
a0
1 -1,-1 -1,-9 1,-9 1,1
ω = −1
Figure 1. Actions bi and b0
i are not rationalizable in U(Ω).
12Note that through the proof of this lemma we do not need results from section 2.4. In other words,
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We will show that neither bi nor b0
i are rationalizable for any type in U(Ω). Note ﬁrst
that an equal mixture between ai and a0
i guarantees a payoﬀ of 0. Thus, bi and b0
i are best-
replies only if player i is certain that the opponent plays an action in {b−i,b0
−i}, and the
action is correlated with the state. Now if i assigns greater than 1/2 probability to state
+1, then it is easily veriﬁed that action ai achieves strictly higher payoﬀ than bi, and action
a0
i achieves strictly higher payoﬀ than b0
i, regardless of the opponent’s strategy. Likewise, if
the probability of state +1 is less than 1/2, then ai must do better than b0
i and a0
i better
than bi. Thus, actions bi or b0
i can be rationalizable only for types who assign the two states
equal probability and who assign probability 1 to opponent’s types for whom b−i or b0
−i are
rationalizable. Now the game is symmetric, so the same analysis applies to player −i with
the player’s roles reversed. Putting these two conclusions together, actions bi and b0
i are
rationalizable only for types of player i who assign equal probability to the two states, and
probability 1 to the event that player −i has the same beliefs and assigns probability 1 to the
event that bi and b0
i are rationalizable for i. By induction, bi and b−i are rationalizable only
for those types of player i for whom it is common-knowledge that the two states are equally
likely. Let υi be the type in Ui(Ω) with this hierarchy of beliefs, and υ−i the analogous type
for player −i. Note that in U(Ω), type υi assigns probability 1 to υ−i and equal probability to
the two states. But then no matter what mixed action is played by υ−i, it is never correlated
with the state. Thus bi and b0
i can never be best-replies, hence never be rationalizable for
type υi.
Nevertheless, both bi and b0
i are rationalizable for all types in the type space from the
introduction. Indeed, any pure strategy proﬁle in which the two types of each player play
diﬀerent actions in {bi,b0
i} is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
6.2. Upper-Hemicontinuity. The literature has had some interest in ﬁnding the “right”
topology on the universal type space to capture similarity of types with respect to their
strategic behavior. One requirement of such a topology is that the rationalizable correspon-
dence should be upper hemi-continuous. Our results shed some light on what would be
required of such a topology. We have shown (Proposition 6) that a suﬃcient condition for
upper hemi-continuity is that the topology be ﬁne enough so that conditional beliefs are
continuous. Here we show that this is in general necessary as well.
Suppose that Ω = {−1,1} and consider the game from the introduction and the following






2 if t−i ∈ {ti,−ti} and sign[ti · ω] = sign[t−i],
0 otherwise34 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
It is easy to verify that these beliefs are generated by a common prior and they are
continuous as a function of ti. However conditional beliefs over Ω exhibit a discontinuity at
ti = t−i = 0. Indeed, if ti = t−i 6= 0, then ti assigns probability 1 to state ω = 1 conditional
on t−i, but if ti = t−i = 0, then both states have equal conditional probability.
For ti = t−i 6= 0, the set {−ti,+ti} × {−t−i,t−i} is a belief- closed subspace which is
isomorphic to the ﬁrst type space from the introduction. Thus, all actions are rationalizable
for these types. However, the belief-closed subspace {0} × {0}, is isomorphic to the second
type space and hence action ci is the unique rationalizable action for types ti = t−i = 0. Thus,
for this ﬁnite game with a ﬁnite set of states of the world and continuous belief-mapping,
the rationalizable correspondence is not upper hemi-continuous.
6.3. Discontinuous Games. We have deﬁned rationalizability as a ﬁxed-point of the in-
terim best-reply operator. Just as Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) showed in the complete
information case, this is equivalent to the more customary iterative deﬁnition for compact
and continuous games. However, the ﬁxed point deﬁnition is more ﬂexible as it is guaran-
teed to exist (although possibly empty) for any game (note that the proof of proposition 1
assumes nothing about the game.) Thus, all of our results that do not rely on the iterative
characterization of rationalizability in extend immediately to discontinuous games. For ex-
ample, Lemma 3 uses only the ﬁxed-point deﬁnition and since the conclusion of Proposition
5 relies only on Lemma 3, we can extend our results to conclude that for any game, two
types have the same rationalizable sets if they have the same ∆-hierarchies. In particular
this is true even for games in which the rationalizable sets are reached only after transﬁnitely
many rounds of elimination, see Lipman (1994).
6.4. Universal Type Space for the Measurable Case. Following the literature, we say
that a type space U over a space of basic uncertainty X is universal among type spaces with
property Y if for every such type space there is a unique mapping into U which preserves
beliefs. Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994) showed that there exists a universal type space for
all continuous type spaces, assuming X is a Polish space. On the other hand, Heifetz and
Samet (1999) showed that there is no universal type space for measurable (not necessarily
continuous) type spaces when X is assumed only to be measurable. Our Theorem 1 is a
positive result for an in-between case. It shows the existence of a universal measurable type
space under the assumption that X is Polish. This may be comforting because while there
may be good reason to assume some structure on the physical world X, but there is no good
reason to assume structure on a type space which is nothing more than an artiﬁcial modeling
construct.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 35
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Appendix A. Sketch of proof of theorem 1
We follow a construction of universal type space over Polish space X from Mertens, Sorin,
and Zamir (1994). Suppose that we have a sequence of Polish spaces {Pn}n≥0 with a sequence
of continuous mappings hn : Pn+1 → Pn. Then the projective limit is a subset P ⊆ P0×P1×...
of all points (p0,p1,...), such that hn (pn+1) = pn for all n. We can show that such set is
a Polish space in product topology. There are continuous induced mappings Hn : P → Pn,
which are projections of sequence on its nth coordinate.
We may construct an universal space U (X) for Polish X as a projective limit of hierarchies
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for n > 0.
The last mapping is a transported measure through mapping idX ×h
n−1





−i . Then U (X) is an projective limit of the system (Un
i ,hn












Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994) show that if type space T is continuous (belief mapping
is continuous) then there exists a sequence of continuous u
T,n







which extend to the continuous mapping uT
i : Ti → Ui, which is a unique exact and preserves
beliefs. The diﬀerence in our case is that we are not able to guarantee continuity of mappings
u
T,n
i . However, we show that weak measurability of belief mapping assures that maps u
T,n
i
deﬁned exactly in the same way as in Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994) are measurable.
Moreover, the generate pointwise converging measurable mappings u
T,n,u∗
i
i : Ti → Ui, for
some u∗
i ∈ Ui, which converge to to measurable mapping uT
i : Ti → Ui. This mapping is, by
the same reasons, unique exact and belief preserving mapping.
Precisely, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 10. Suppose that there is a Polish space B and measurable mapping φ−i : T−i → B.
Then mapping Φi : Ti → ∆(X × B) deﬁned with








Proof. We need to check whether for any measurable function f : X × B → R, sets
{ti : Φi (ti)[f] < 0} are measurable. But
{ti : Φi (ti)[f] < 0} = {ti : µi (ti)[f (x,φ−i (t−i))] < 0}
and the last set is measurable due to deﬁnition of weak measurability of belief mapping. 
Choose now some u∗
i ∈ Ui and construct mappings u
T,n,u∗
i
i : Ti → Ui with u
T,n,u∗
i














By lemma, each of these mappings is measurable. Moreover, they converge pointwise to
mapping uT
i , which is also measurable (as a pointwise limit of measurable mappings). We
check as in Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994) that it is unique exact and belief-preserving
mapping.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 37
Appendix B. Proof of lemma 2
.
We need the following result
Lemma 11. Let A and B be measurable spaces and g : A × B → [0,1] a jointly measurable
map. If m : A → ∆(B) is measurable, then the map Lg : A → R deﬁned by Lg(a) =
m(a)[g(a,·)] is measurable.
Proof. There exists a sequence of simple functions gn : A × B → R such that gn ↑ g and by
the deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral, for any probability measure ν ∈ ∆(A × B).
ν[gn] → ν[g]
In particular, for any given a ∈ A, if ν is the measure whose marginal on B is m(a) and
whose marginal on A is δa,
L
gn(a) = ν[gn] → ν[g] = L
g(a)
Thus, if we can show that Lf is measurable for all simple functions f, then we will have
shown that Lg is measurable as the pointwise limit of measurable mappings.
First consider f = 1α×β for α ⊂ A and β ⊂ B (measurable.) We have Lf(a) = 1α(a) ·
m(a)(β) which is measurable since m was assumed to be measurable. Thus, Lf is measurable
for all f that are indicators of product sets. Now for any ﬁnite k, let α1,...αk and β1,...,βk








is measurable. Thus if f = 1∩l(αl×βl) =
Q
l 1αl×βl, then Lf is measurable, and if










then Lf is measurable as a linear combination of measurable functions. Note also that
L1¬E = L1−1E = 1 − L1E. Thus Lf is measurable for all indicator functions f of sets in the
algebra generated by the product sets.
Now consider any sequence Xn with Xn ⊂ A × B, Xn ⊂ Xn+1 for all n and ∪nXn = X.
The corresponding sequence L1Xn is an increasing sequence of maps converging pointwise to
L1X. Thus if L1Xn are measurable for all n, so is L1X. It follows that the collection of sets
X such that L1X is measurable is a monotone class. Since it includes the algebra generated
by the product sets, by the monotone class lemma it includes the corresponding σ-algebra,38 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI






for some coeﬃcients cj and measurable sets Xj ⊂ A × B, any such Lf is measurable as a
linear combination of measurable functions. 




is measurable. Deﬁne g(ti,t−i) = f(ρi(ti,t−i),t−i). Note that g is jointly measurable and
µ
∆
i (ti)[f] = µi(ti)[g(ti,·)].
Now apply lemma 11. 
Appendix C. Proof of lemma 6
Let H denote the Hilbert cube [0,1]N. Since Ω is Polish, there is a countable sequence
of functions h∗





k] − τ0 [h∗
k]| and a mapping H : ∆Ω → H





The mapping H embeds ∆Ω (with the weak topology) in the Hilbert cube (with the
product topology). Suppose we have a family F of continuous functions f : H×KA−i → R
such that the collection of sets
{µ : µ[f (h,A)] < 0} ⊆ ∆(H×KA−i)
is a subbase for the weak topology on ∆(H×KA−i) (in which case we say that F generates
the topology). Then, because H is an embedding, it will follow that the corresponding family




0(τ,K) = f(H(τ),K) for some f ∈ F}
generates the topology on ∆(∆Ω×KA−i). The strategy of proof is to ﬁnd such an F so that
the corresponding F0 is included in LG.HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 39
For each natural number n, deﬁne the following set of continuous functions f : [0,1]
n ×









ηk (a1,...,aN2) · z :
for some natural numbers N1,N2 and





where · is a scalar product of two vectors in Rn. Next, deﬁne set of diﬀerences of functions
from Fn
Ln = {f − g : f,g ∈ Fn} ⊆ C ([0,1]
n × KA−i).
We have a lemma:
Lemma 12. Set Ln is uniformly dense in the set C ([0,1]
n × KA−i).
Proof. This is a standard argument applying the lattice version of the Stone-Weierstrass
theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 7.45)). We need to verify that Ln:
• is closed under scalar multiplication: If (f−g) ∈ Ln, then for any λ ∈ R, λ(f−g) ∈ Ln
as well;
• contains constant function: 1 ∈ Ln;
• is closed under ﬁnite sums: ﬁrst note that for any f,g ∈ Fn, z = (z1,...,zm) ∈ [0,1]
n
and K ∈ KA−i



























































so that f +g ∈ Fn. But this implies that for any (f −g),(f0 −g0) ∈ Ln we also have
(f + f0) − (g + g0) ∈ Ln;40 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
• is closed with respect to taking maximum of two functions: for any f,g ∈ Fn, z ∈
[0,1]











































































































Then h = max(f,g) ∈ Fn. Together with the fact that
max{f − g,f
0 − g
0} = max{f + g
0,f
0 + g} − (g + g
0)
and the previous point, it implies that max{f − g,f0 − g0} ∈ Ln for any f−g,f0−g0 ∈
Ln;
• separates points: for any z,z0 ∈ [0,1]
n , z 6= z0, there is vector η ∈ Rn, such that
η·z 6= η·z0. Similarly, for any K,K0 ∈ KA−i, K 6= K0, there is a continuous function
s : A−i → [0,1], such that
f (A) = sup
a∈K
s(a) = 1 > 0 = sup
a∈K0
s(a) = f (A
0).

Finally we can prove lemma 6. Any f ∈ C([0,1]n × KA−i) can be viewed as an ele-
ment f0 ∈ C(H × KA−i) by writing f0(h,K) = f(h1,...,hn,K). By the Stone-Weierstrass
theorem (algebraic version, see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 7.46)) ∪nC([0,1]n ×
KA−i) is uniformly dense in C(H × KA−i). By lemma 12, family Ln is uniformly dense
in C ([0,1]n × KA−i). Thus ∪nLn in uniformly dense in ∪nC([0,1]n × KA−i) and hence in
C(H × KA−i). We conclude that the family ∪nLn generates the topology on ∆(H × KA−i)
(see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 12.2)).
The proof is now completed by showing that each f ∈ Ln corresponds to a function f0
belonging to LG by the formula f0(τ,K) = f(H(τ),K). By the linear structure of LG it
suﬃces to show that for each g ∈ Fn, the composition g ◦ H : ∆Ω × KAG
−i → R belongs toHIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 41
FG. This is veriﬁed by noting that


































Ω → R, g ◦ H is an element of FG. 
Appendix D. Proofs of Lemmas from Section 5
Proof of Lemma 8. Pick M > sup|ui(a,ω)| (recall that we assume that ui is bounded for
this class of games.) Let (ak,tk) → (a∞,t∞) ∈ A×T. The set {tk}∞
k=1 is compact, and so by
∆-continuity, the corresponding family of measures {ρi(tk)} ⊂ ∆Ω is also compact. Because
Ω is a Polish space, the family is tight, i.e. for every ε > 0, there exists a compact Kε ⊂ Ω
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 → 0
i.e., the sequence of functions ui(ak,·) : Kε → R converges uniformly to ui(a∞,·). It follows




















  ≤ limsup
k











    + 2εM
= 2εM
and since ε was arbitrary, we have shown πi(ak,tk) → πi(a∞,t∞). 
Proof of Lemma 9. The proof uses the following result (see Aliprantis and Border (1994,
Theorem 12.20)): If X is a Polish space, then a family F ⊂ ∆(X) has compact closure if
and only if F is tight, i.e. for every ε > 0 there is a compact K ⊂ X such that ν(K) > 1−ε
for all ν ∈ F.
Pick ε > 0. Since Si is compact, by the continuity of T so is µT
i (Si) = {µT
i (ti) : ti ∈ Si}
and by the continuity of marginals, so is margT−i µT
i (Si). By the above result, there is a
compact K ⊂ T−i such that margT−i µT
i (ti)(K) > 1 − ε for all ti ∈ Si. Thus for any ti ∈ Si42 JEFFREY C. ELY AND MARCIN P , ESKI
and σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(B|ti), we have σ
∆,ti
−i (K × A−i) = margT−i µT
i (ti)(K) > 1 − ε. Since K × A−i





is tight and therefore has compact closure.
Because σ
∆,k




proof is concluded by showing that σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(B|ti).
(1) (δx denotes Dirac measure on x.) margTi σ
∆,l
−i = δtl
i → δti and by continuity of
marginals, margTi σ
∆,l
−i → margTi σ∆




−i = margT−i µT
i (tl
i). Because T is continuous, margT−i µT
i (tl
i) → margT−i µT
i (ti)
and since margT−i σ
∆,l
−i → margT−i σ∆
−i, we have margT−i σ∆




−i (B) = 1. Since taking marginals is continuous and the set of proba-




−i ](B) = 1.
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